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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to develop a new concept for the EU in order to define and measure poverty no 
longer on the basis of income1, but on so called capabilities to argue for a capability oriented social 
policy. The capability approach (CA) was originally developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen2 and 
can be interpreted as critique of the utilitarian tradition of standard economics. In Sen’s view, 
mainstream economic analysis operates on a very narrow base and does not include central information 
about the human condition. The main points of Sen’s critique shall be discussed by way of introduction 
in section one. In offering an alternative framework of economic evaluation, Sen is very much inspired 
by the work of Adam Smith (1723-1790) and tried to bring him back into the economic and social 
discussion. The connections between Smith and Sen and the main elements of the CA will be discussed 
in section two.  
Within this framework, a further conceptualisation of the EU-approach becomes possible. Poverty will 
now be defined in terms of some basic, normatively and empirically justified, capabilities. The 
challenge in section four is to find these capabilities and make them explicit. The “tightrope” walk 
between both aspects, viz. theoretical claim and practical implementation, is not a simple task. 
Nevertheless it must be undertaken in order to guarantee both scientific value and empirical 
applicability. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to argue for a change of perspective in both 
poverty measurement and more explicitly so in poverty policy at EU level. In the concluding chapter 
implications for a capability oriented social inclusion policy in the EU will be discussed in further 
detail. 
                                                     
1 The poverty line in the EU is set at an income lower than 60% of national median equalised household income. 
2 Amartya Sen won the Nobel Price for Economics in 1998 “for his contributions to welfare economics”. 
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1. Introduction: Sen’s Critique of Utilitarianism and Welfare Economics 
Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach (henceforth CA) should be seen as the result of his consistent 
critique of standard economics. Sen argued against the narrow utilitarian base and also against the 
reductionist view of individuals (in its various notions) of welfare economics. His main point is that it 
is not possible to answer the question of the relevant weight of economic needs in the theoretical space 
of this approach, in which individual preferences are measured exclusively. The utilitarian 
informational base seems insufficient to Sen. He is as interested, however, in a paradigmatic change as 
in broadening this base. His aim is to develop solutions to real and urgent questions as inequality and 
poverty. In Sen’s view all of the utilitarian evaluative principles, which he discusses in several papers, 
viz. sum-ranking3, welfarism4 and consequentialism5 lack crucial information to do so.  
The utility concept is one-dimensional and ignores important non-utility aspects. This, however, results 
in a reductionist view of human motivation. Sum-ranking for instance “[…] merges the utility bits 
together as one total lump, losing in the process both the identity of the individuals as well as their 
separateness. […] By now persons as persons have dropped fully out of the assessment of states of 
affairs” (Sen und Williams 1982, p.5). Welfarism, which ranks alternative states of affairs, also 
includes utility-information alone. Sen argues that if we exclude all considerations except to utility, 
moral evaluation may have bizarre results as important backward information about actions and 
motivations in these states are disregarded. Non-utility information is caused by different sources of 
utility. The welfarist restriction of information strongly limits the scope of moral judgment of different 
states of affairs. This limitation is emphasised in showing cases that are identical in utility but differ in 
certain non-utility aspects. The same point is true for consequentialism. Sen doesn’t reject 
consequentialist evaluation as such, but once again criticises the exclusive consideration of utility: 
“Consequential analysis may be taken to be necessary, but not sufficient, for many moral decisions” 
(Sen 1987, p.76). The exclusion of actions, motives and processes in evaluating states of affairs is not 
acceptable considering the objective of getting something to know about the real world and real social 
problems. 
In 1932 Lionel Robbins published his famous An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science, in which he radically refused normativity in economics. By claiming that “[…] economics is 
the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means, which 
have alternative uses” (Robbins 1932, p.15), he clearly demonstrated that economics is neutral towards 
ends and is unconditionally positive as research program. This claim was combined with a clear 
separation of ethics and economics, which was a condition that “was quite unfashionable then, though 
extremely fashionable now” (Sen 1987, p.2). Robbins’ critique was directed against the (normative) 
hedonistic construction of welfare economics in associating happiness with materialistic well-being. 
                                                     
3 Sum-ranking means that “one collection of individual utilities is at least as good as another if and only if it has at least as 
large a sum total” (Sen 1979, p.468) 
4 Welfarism means that “the judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of affairs must be based exclusively on, 
and taken as an increasing function of, the respective collections of individual utilities in these states.” (Sen 1979, p.468) 
5 Consequentialist evaluation says that all decisions should be valued due to their consequences.  
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This criticism had a great impact on the mainstream economic community and, and resulting in 
normative statements and political recommendations being frowned thereafter. Thus, the majority of 
economists avoided the object of welfare economics and “for the sake of maintaining their status as 
scientists, they were willing to become technicians, concerned soley with observation, description, 
classification and the collection of data” (Scitovsky 1951, p.303).  
Robbins argued that interpersonal comparisons of utility had no scientific basis: “There is no means of 
testing the magnitude of A’s satisfaction as compared with B’s” (Robbins 1938, p.123). The argument 
was derived from the insight that the law of diminishing utility makes assumptions that can’t be 
verified by observation or introspection. Furthermore it implies the “great metaphysical question of the 
scientific comparability of different individual experiences” (Robbins 1932, p.121). Robbins was not 
only concerned with opposing interpersonal comparisons for scientific reasons, but also to mark them 
as normative and ethical6. Sen argues that if it is accepted that these comparisons are scientifically 
meaningless – a position he doesn’t support – then “the statement that person A is happier than B 
would be nonsensical – ethical nonsense just as much as it would be descriptive nonsense” (Sen 1987, 
p.31). In Sen’s view normative judgments and the evaluation of states of affairs are integral 
components of economic theory. Part of such evaluation, according to him, lies in interpersonal 
comparison. This comparison, however, should not be based on the concept of utility, but on a broader 
informational foundation as was said before.  
Robbins’ analysis found general approval and finally triggered the development of a new welfare 
economics. Economists such as Nicholas Kaldor, John R. Hicks and Paul Samuelson marked the 
beginning of Paretian welfare economics on the basis of the new consensus to do without interpersonal 
comparisons. The aim was to show that many economic conclusions could be derived from individual 
preference orderings and that cardinal measures of utility weren’t necessary. The so called ordinalists 
didn’t need to argue for the impossibility of cardinal measure, it was sufficient for them to show that 
they were not necessary (Brennan 1993, p.133). Sen agrees that comparisons of mere feelings are not 
possible but adds that in describing someone as being better off than another person can’t be reduced to 
such feelings. He argues that “the problem of comparing the well-being of people has to be dissociated 
from the insistence on sticking to the utilitarian strait-jacket of comparisons of pleasures or desires” 
(Sen 1993b, p.56). In leaving out interpersonal comparisons but still sticking to the concept of utility, 
the new welfare economics, says Sen, further restricts its already narrow informational base. Robbins 
doesn’t make a difference between “some comparability and total comparability of units” (Sen 1970, 
p.99f). Distributional issues therefore get lost in welfare economics.  
This critique aims also at the Pareto rule, which was needed after the rejection of interpersonal 
comparison as new (weakly normative) criterion. However, it says nothing about inequality and the 
distribution of income and well-being within a society.  
                                                     
6 Robbins (1938, p.123): “It involves an element of conventional valuation. Hence it is essentially normative. It has no place in 
pure science.” 
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Thus, it is not an adequate instrument for analysing social problems and “is an extremely limited way 
of assessing social achievements” (Sen 1987, p.35). Sen advocates partial interpersonal comparisons, as 
well as partial cardinality and incomplete social preferences “to show that in certain circumstances we 
can still reasonably say that total economic welfare would be increased by a more equitable distribution 
of income” (Myint 1972, p.1170). Such comparisons, however, can’t be based on utility alone.  
On the base of his fundamental critique of utilitarian principles of welfare economics, Sen introduced 
so called capabilities and functionings to evaluate social states. These criteria should guarantee that 
social evaluation and the analysis of social problems such as inequality and poverty becomes possible 
with the instruments of economic theory. 
2. Capability-Theory and its Roots in Adam Smith 
The CA is the logical result of Sen’s critique of welfare economics. Not only it reflects the purpose to 
found a more realistic economic theory, but it also sharpens the consciousness of a new political 
economy in the tradition of classical authors. The approach is a framework for the evaluation of 
individual and collective welfare and as such provides a theoretical basis for analysis of inequality, 
poverty und politics. In the following, I briefly discuss the main elements of the approach, in order to 
then examine its main connections to the theories of Adam Smith.  
When Sen introduces functionings and capabilities to function, he does so, in order to provide an 
alternative to one-dimensional utility theory. Functionings are realised capabilities and as such 
represent individual achievements. Sen defines them as ‘beings’ and ‘doings’, which reflect the status 
quo of an individual or a group (e.g. being healthy). Functionings, therefore, represent the state of 
being and are contained within it (Sen 1985, p.10). In contrast to resources, which generate utility and 
thus have a mere instrumental character, functionings measure well-being as a result. Like an 
enterprise, a person produces output. Resources, however, must be seen as the input (income, 
commodities) of the production. While the level of output is determined by the input, it also depends on 
technical factors like the machines used, which influence the conversion of inputs into outputs 
(individual intelligence, personal relations, physical state, etc.). These are the non-monetary side 
conditions of decision-making (Kuklys 2005, p.5). Sen refers to these conditions as conversion factors, 
which can be taken to show that under certain circumstances two people with the same endowments 
may have a different level of well-being. 
Achieved functionings, however, do not deliver sufficient information for evaluating development and 
living standards. In order to emphasise the fundamental importance of freedom as a positive concept, 
Sen also introduces capabilities, which represent the freedom to achieve valuable functionings. The 
capability concept refers to the freedom of a person to live the life she has reason to choose. “It 
represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. 
Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of 
life or another. The capability-set can therefore be seen as a representation of substantial freedom” (Sen 
1992, p.40).  
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While functionings are constitutive components of well-being, capabilities stand for the freedom to 
achieve well-being. In other words, this is about the real possibilities of individuals to self-actualise in 
the way one desires. There are two reasons for emphasising freedom. First, there is an evaluative 
aspect, whereby the extent of enhancement of particular freedoms is analysed in conduction with 
development and living standards. The second reason concerns effectiveness of freedom in generating 
progress. Freedom of action is not only a fundamental part of development in Sen’s view, but also its 
main motor. Furthermore it contributes to assure other freedoms, which are indispensable for a 
developed society.  
Sen argues, however, that not only well-being, but also agency should be at the centre of attention: “A 
person may value the promotion of certain causes and the occurrence of certain things, even though the 
importance that is attached to these developments are not reflected by the advancement of his or her 
well-being” (Sen 1987, p.41). This means that for a developed societies it is not only of fundamental 
importance to achieve a certain level of well-being, but also to act against one’s own well-being in 
order to pursue goals of different value.  
Summarising the main elements of the approach then, it should be said that it defines well-being as 
well-being freedom (which corresponds to agency and agency-freedom) and measures it as the 
capability of a person to achieve certain goals. Not the actual but the possible state of being, however, 
is important for the analysis of welfare. Each approach asks for a very special kind of information. Sen, 
however, advocates pluralism considering information and principles, which is “a claim about the form 
of moral structure” (Sen 1985b, p.176) and has to be understood as a message to abandon a certain 
monism, which rejects the view that valid well-being may occur in several forms. Capabilities and 
functionings therefore should build the information base for further evaluation. Which capabilities an 
individual is able to generate, depends not only on the act of choice (I’m choosing one functioning-
vector out of my capability-set), but also on the conversion factors, which may be influenced socially 
and individually.  
Several philosophical influences may be found at the roots of capability theory. Martha Nussbaum 
(1988) for example, emphasised the Aristotelian connection to the CA, and Sen himself speaks of 
Aristotle’s view of the human good as “the most powerful conceptual connection” (1993, p.46). While 
the reference to Aristotle is an effective rhetorical device that serves more as a terminological stimulus, 
I see a much stronger affiliation of Sen’s work to the ideas of Adam Smith. Throughout in his writings, 
Sen himself has frequently invoked this classical author and his holistic view of society and economy. 
In fact, not only Sen’s model of economic behaviour but also his view of markets and capitalism are 
highly inspired by Smith (cf. Eiffe 2008). 
Markets, in Sen’s view, serve to generate freedom and their efficiency has to be valued in terms of this 
generating process: “Combining extensive use of markets with the development of social opportunities 
must be seen as a part of still broader comprehensive approach that also emphasizes freedoms of other 
kinds (democratic rights, security guarantees, opportunities of cooperation and so on)” (Sen 1999, 
p.127).  
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The challenges a market system has to cope with, have to be related to problems of justice in the 
distribution of substantial freedoms. A freedom related understanding of market efficiency (compared 
to a welfare economic perspective) has the crucial advantage that “the idea of freedom involves several 
distinct issues, including processes and procedures as well as actual opportunities that people have to 
live the way they would choose” (Sen 1993a, p.538). Both Smith and Sen advocate the view that free 
competition will have positive effects und special institutional and social arrangements. In such a 
system government is in charge of balancing economic progress and social needs in society. According 
to this view, the state has to enable its citizens and to promote their development potential. The 
freedom related approach admits a change of perspective and turns back to Smith. From technical-
economic analysis we can now turn again to an integrated approach of specific ethical and political 
elements. The concept of capability owes much to this holistic view. Well-being is not determined by 
the possession of economic resources, but by the capabilities into which these resources can be 
converted. Markets, therefore, have to be valued in terms of the capabilities they are able to generate.  
The idea of capability itself, however, is Smithian in its origins. For Smith, poverty was the inability to 
fulfil basic needs. The commodities needed to fulfil these needs vary from society to society, while the 
necessaries themselves remain the same. The prototype capability “to appear in public without shame” 
first forwarded by Smith and often cited in Sen’s work, demands different commodities in different 
times and places. As Sen states, “the basic point of social variation of form related to the same general 
functioning” and thus the notion of capability “goes back in fact, to Adam Smith (1776)” (Sen 1992, 
p.109). Poverty defined as a deprivation of basic capabilities has an absolute core and cannot be 
interpreted as relative in the space of capabilities. In Sen’s opinion not only poverty but human 
development in general has to be valued in terms of the capabilities a society is able to generate. The 
constituting element of living standard is not the commodity as such or its function, but the capability 
to realise various things with it. Poverty regarding capabilities is an absolute concept. Regarding 
commodities, however, it will turn to a relative form (Sen 1983, 1985c).  
3. Conceptualising an EU approach  
Poverty as a deprivation of capabilities 
As was shown above, the CA offers a framework for evaluating social phenomena such as justice, 
inequality and social exclusion. The approach was presented as general theoretical framework and 
should now be taken to build a foundation for a definition of poverty in the EU. Although there has 
been a shift from ‘poverty’ to ‘social exclusion’ in the EU, poverty measurement is still focused 
primarily on income and resources and “policymakers […] in EU member states appear to interpret 
‘social exclusion’ as ‘exclusion of the labour market’, ‘acute poverty and material deprivation’ (or 
both) or, less frequently, ‘inability to excess basic social rights’” (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos 2002, 
p.212). According to the CA, however, poverty is interpreted as a lack of actual possibilities to choose 
different forms of living and “can be sensibly identified in terms of capability deprivation” (Sen 1999b, 
p.88). The approach “concentrates on deprivations that are intrinsically important (unlike low income, 
which is only instrumentally significant)” (ibid.).  
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Such a deprivation can be the result of social restrictions on the one hand, or of personal circumstances 
on the other (Drèze und Sen 1995, p.11). Low income and other economic aspects are of instrumental 
significance only and must be analysed due to their role in retrenching capabilities. As Sen puts it “the 
instrumental relation between low income and low capability is variable between different communities 
and even between different families and different individuals (the impact of income on capabilities is 
contingent and conditional)” (1999b, p.88). 
It is important to understand that income is only one – although an important – aspect of capability 
deprivation: “The instrumental connections, important as they are, cannot replace the need for a basic 
understanding of the nature and characteristics of poverty” (Sen 1999b, p.92). Sen turns the tables: 
Evaluation of poverty is no longer based on earned income, but on the capabilities that can be 
generated through it. Capabilities, however, are of intrinsic importance to a good life. Furthermore, the 
relation between income and capabilities is variable and depends on conversion factors such as age, 
sex, social role, tradition and others. The achievement of functionings will be more difficult for 
handicapped or (chronically) ill people by given income. The availability of means gets thus substituted 
by the ends people have reason to pursue in the analysis of poverty.  
While an income poverty threshold draws an interpersonal constant line that is misleading in 
identifying and evaluating poverty, the conversion of income into fundamental capabilities is variable, 
not only from person to person, but also from society to society. Thus, the ability to achieve minimal 
acceptable capability-levels comes along with different levels of income. Sen’s central point is to 
emphasise interpersonal and intersocial differences in the relationship between income and capabilities 
(Sen 1993, p.41).  
In addition to income as isolated indicator, Sen and others (Sen 1985 c, Atkinson 2003, Salais and 
Villeneuve 2004, Burchardt and Vizzard 2007) also criticised the relativity of EU-poverty measures 
and others. A relative deprivation of certain goods entails an absolute deprivation of capabilities. The 
EU-poverty line for instance, doesn’t allow for identifying an absolute income threshold to be set at an 
income level, at which basic needs can be fulfilled: “We are not able to tell whether or not a household 
with incomes below one of these European thresholds has sufficient means to live decently or not” 
(Volkert 2006, p.364).  
How to find central capabilities 
Implementing the CA must be understood as change in perspective. In the capability-view poverty can 
be seen as biographical endpoint of an impoverishment process caused by “withholding” central 
capability-generating inputs. Poverty, which results from the interplay of economic, social, political, 
historical and biographical factors in various fundamental dimensions, is enforced by a dynamic 
circular and cumulative process as was shown by Myrdal (1957). For conceptualising the CA for the 
EU, it is therefore necessary to concretise these dimensions. As Riveaud and Salais (2001) noted, a 
capability-program for the EU should first be compatible with EU principles and existing contracts and 
second maximise Europe’s added value within the logic of the subsidiarity principle. 
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In order to decide, which human spheres are to be declared as intrinsically valuable and to make a 
statement about central human capabilities in the EU, the process of European integration has to be 
taken into account. 
Before thinking about general capabilities, however, there should be clarity about some basic 
capabilities constituting an absolute poverty line, as suggested by Volkert (2006). The absolute core of 
poverty must be considered and should be represented by a budget standard, which has to be achieved 
in order to avoid physical damage (Sen 1985). Volkert (ibid, p.370) argues that such budget standard 
should be elicited by experts using objective methods. While a budget standard includes such basic 
capabilities as “to meet one’s nutritional requirements”, “to be sheltered and clothed” and “to avoid 
premature death”, other fundamental ones such as the capability “to participate in the social life of the 
community” and to “avoid illiteracy” are not contained explicitly. I would therefore argue for a 
consideration of these two basic capabilities not monetarily measurable. Certainly the matter of which 
basic capabilities should be included can be left open to discussion. The number of indicators, however, 
should be kept small and those chosen should give yet deeper insights about absolute poverty. 
Furthermore, Sen himself heads these five as basic capabilities to be achieved in order to avoid 
existential damage. With reference to Klasen (2005) these are to be weighted between “heavily 
deprived” to “non-deprived” and made comparable this way. We are now able to gain information 
about basic capability achievements, which are conditional for generating further capability-sets. This 
model has the advantage that absolute poverty can be analysed in a three-dimensional space and is not 
dependant on monetary resources only. Figure 1 shows basic capability achievement of two fictitious 
individuals as coloured areas in three-dimensional space:  
Figure 1: Three-Dimensional Basic Capability-Sets 
Basic Capability Achievement 
0
1
2
3
4
BS
FESI
Household/individual 1
Household/individual 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
BS
FESI
Household/individual 2
 
BS = Budget Standard, SI = Social Integration, FE = Fundamental Education; 1 (heavily deprive), 
2 (deprived), 3 (easily deprived), 4 (not deprived), 5 (well-off) 
In addition to the basic capability level, which is conditional upon the generation of further capability-
sets, the identification of general capabilities to be achieved is a central element of EU-wide 
operationalisation. Disproportionate complexity, however, should be avoided for two reasons: First, 
data will be limited and second, public debate should not be exacerbated.  
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As I suggest, consensus about decisive capability-dimensions in fundamental social spheres can be 
achieved on basis of EU-contracts, -documents and of EU-Council and –Parliament decisions. 
Deprivation in these dimensions should be avoided in order to promote social cohesion and prevent 
poverty in EU member states. Crucial insights on the priorities of the EU about their objectives of 
fighting poverty and social exclusion can be gained especially from the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Lisbon (EC 2000) and Nice (EC 2000a) and the 
Charta of Fundamental Rights, which will be legally binding if the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 comes into 
force. Comparing allowed rights and commitments of EU-Council and Commission to implement these 
rights shows the following (poverty-relevant) picture (related issues are to be found in one row): 
Table 1: Comparison of Rights and Commitments expressed in EU documents 
Charta of Fundamental Rights 
(2000) 
Amsterdam (1997) Lisbon (2000) 
Right to human dignity (Art.1)   
Right to liberty and security (Art.6)   
Access to services of general 
economic interest (Art. 36) 
 Promoting the access of everyone 
to resources, rights, goods and 
services 
Right to social security and social 
assistance (Art. 34) 
Right to protection from 
poverty and social exclusion 
(Art.136) 
Preventing the risks of exclusion; 
Acting for the socially weak  
Right to engage in work and to pursue 
a freely chosen or accepted 
occupation. (Art. 15/1) 
 Promoting the participation in the 
labour market 
Fair and just working conditions 
(Art.31) 
Improvement of living and 
working conditions (Art.136) 
 
Right to education and to have access 
to vocational and continuing training 
(Art.14/1) 
  
Sources: EC 1997, EC 2000, European Community 2000 
The EU in general focuses very much on employment and on the economic states of persons as 
indicators of well-being, which is reflected in table 1. Sen (1997) identifies unemployment as a 
fundamental problem in Europe and considers it as a substantial capability-failure.  
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We can also find an emphasis on work conditions as well as commitment to delete illiteracy and lack of 
basic education as precondition of non-participation in social activities, reflected in the Right to 
education7 (EP 2000,p.11). Furthermore the Charter of Fundamental Rights privileges the right to 
human dignity and freedom, claims we can also find in the CA as intrinsic values.  
The Charter also addresses certain target groups, viz. mothers, children, elderly, families, employed 
and unemployed persons, migrants, income-poor people, disabled, persons in need of care and 
chronically ill persons. These groups can be divided in three levels of capability deprivation, as is 
shown in table 2. In the table, the capability-dimensions, which are implicitly contained in the 
“protected sphere”, shall also be filtered: 
                                                     
7 “Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training”(EP 2000, p.11) 
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Table 2: Target-group splitting and filtering capability-dimensions 
Level of deprivation Target group Protected sphere Capability-dimension 
Non-capability- 
deprived 
Mothers Social/material risks in 
case of motherhood 
Reintegration in the 
labour market 
Self-determination 
Social participation 
Independence 
Children Risks of being under 
disability 
Risks of dependence 
Personal development 
Social participation 
Elderly Risks of dependence 
and social isolation 
Social participation 
Independence 
Self-determination 
Employed persons Risks of exploitation  
Risks of  employment 
(in general) 
Self-determination 
Health 
Self-esteem 
Families Disadvantages resulting 
from family status  
 
Personal development 
Social participation 
Securing living standard 
Temporarily 
capability-deprived  
Unemployed Risks of unemployment 
Active support 
Self-esteem 
Social participation 
Employment 
Migrants Social/material sphere  
discrimination 
Social participation 
Employment 
Independence 
Respect 
Income-poor Risks of social/material 
deprivation 
Housing 
social participation 
securing living standard 
Permanantly 
capability-deprived 
Disabled persons Social/material sphere 
Active support of 
reintegration in the 
labour market; 
Active measures of 
guaranteeing mobility 
Independence 
Employment 
Personal development 
Social participation 
Mobility 
Persons in need of 
care 
Risks of social/material 
deprivation 
Charity 
Chronically ill 
persons 
Risks of social/material 
deprivation 
Charity 
Source: own source 
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For the first group, the EU wants to maintain the status of non-deprivation. Preventing social and 
economic risks is the policy task here. Furthermore, the other deprivation-groups shall be supported 
actively. Protection measures arise from the group they are targeted toward. Certain sub-groups, 
however, can’t be integrated clearly in one deprivation level. Pregnant women or mothers of children 
under 3 for example may be classified as either non-capability-deprived or temporarily deprived. As 
the circumstance of having or being a mother does not restrict the possibility space per se, I would not 
predispose this group as capability-deprived. Actually many disadvantages arise from motherhood. 
These, however, should be analysed under the circumstances, in which they occur. Migrants are 
another group whose classification is worth discussing. The assumption of temporary deprivation 
seems conclusive to me for several reasons: First, migrants (of the first generation) have linguistic 
difficulties. Consequently, even if formal educational attainment were achieved, they can’t tap their full 
potential. Second, a number of institutional and economic barriers accompany these general problems 
for immigrants (cf. Belot and Ederveen 2005).  
The filtration of capabilities is the result of looking for positive intrinsic dimensions behind the 
bureaucratic formulations used in EU documents. Are the identified dimensions capabilities in Sen’s 
sense? Can for example charity be seen as a capability? Charity, in my view, is the ability to rely on the 
action ability of other persons in the case of lacking autonomy. Also such things, which let people 
achieve advantages without active effort, may be considered as capabilities (Sen 1993). Charity 
therefore is one essential capability for people in need of care. Also the capability “mobility” might 
contain passive elements. It is about the ability to move freely, despite actual restrictions. Deprivations 
in this sphere especially affect permanent-deprived persons. Self-determination and independence are 
closely related, although some deprived groups might be self-determined despite being dependent. Self-
esteem and respect are more difficult to operationalise. Their intrinsic value, however, is beyond 
question. 
Some capabilities, such as the capability “to participate in social life” (social participation), are 
important for all or many groups. Political implications, however, may differ for each group. In my 
view the division in target groups and deprivation levels is a central step towards a capability-oriented 
social policy addressing these groups in a differentiated way. The general division carried out in figure 
1, however, should not be considered as completed, but rather be regarded as a pattern for evaluating 
different levels of deprivation of several groups. This way poverty can be efficiently analysed and 
policy measures can be pinpointed to specific groups. In principle, European social systems consider 
target groups. However, different welfare regimes act differently. While conservative regimes generally 
react with monetary transfers to prevent poverty, the social democratic type tries to strengthen certain 
groups by universal measures (Esping-Andersen 1990). Operationalisation of these capabilities should 
therefore being carried out on a national level.  
A filtration of general capabilities that are not addressed to specific target groups, can also be executed. 
In addition to EU treaties and documents, we should also take into consideration EU indicators of 
social inclusion and have a look behind the information gained through them (European Commission 
2006).  
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The purpose is to make explicit capability dimensions, which implicitly count as valuable in the EU. 
Available information has therefore to be transformed in general capability-information as was done in 
Eiffe (2008, p.293ff). We can identify eight general dimensions. Hereafter, these dimensions will be 
interpreted as meta-capabilities. The idea behind this concept is that each meta-capability contains 
certain features of potentials, which should be operationalised separately. Hence, a meta-capability 
expresses the combination of various capabilities within one specific sphere and provides aggregated 
information about the capability-sets contained. Table 3 gives an overview over meta-capabilities, 
definitions and sub-capabilities: 
Table 3: Meta-Capabilities, Definitions and Sub-Capabilities 
Meta-Capability Definition  Contained Sub-Capabilities 
Human dignity  The ability to live a life in 
dignity and respect. 
 a) Personal integrity 
b) Ability to force one’s rights 
Freedom of arbitrariness The ability to live without 
arbitrary interventions in 
everyday life. 
     a) Freedom of movement 
     b) Political freedom 
Health The ability to lead a healthy 
life. 
     a) Health state 
     b) Access to health systems 
Education The ability to being educated 
formally and personally the 
way one wishes to. 
 a) Formal education 
b) Personal development 
Social participation The ability to have social 
contact and be part of the 
community. 
 a) Participation in community 
b) Political participation 
Employment The ability to have employment 
or to pursue activities one is 
interested in instead. 
 a) Access to employment 
b) Informal employment 
Housing  The ability to have sufficient 
living space and appropriate 
living conditions. 
 a) Living space 
b) Living satisfaction 
8. Living Standard (material)   The ability to participate in 
economic growth and to be 
satisfied with one’s economic 
status. 
 a) Subjective well-being 
b) Economic participation 
Source: own source 
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A capability approach for the EU 
An EU-wide operationalisation of the capabilities discussed above, should not be seen as a 
supranational issue of the EU. Rather our model entails involvement by actors at all administrative 
levels (regional, national, supranational). According to the structure developed above, I suggest a three-
levelled approach: First level is operated supranationally and refers to the aggregated meta-capabilities. 
The operationalisation of sub-capabilities, however, takes place at level two and may vary due to 
central social, political and legal conversion factors in the member states. Technically the sub-
capabilities will be divided into a micro level consisting of subjective information and a macro level, 
through which the micro level will be weighted and complemented with objective data as will be 
shown in table 4. Finally, at third level central target group capabilities, as identified in table 2, should 
be operationalised on a national level. As mentioned, policy measures vary in dependence of the 
national social system for each group and also the target groups themselves might differ from member 
state to member state.  
The development of question modules and new items would be of interest for operationalising sub-
capabilities. The self-evaluation of capabilities, however, is problematic, as preferences might be 
adapted to the situations people are living in. According to the theory of adaptive preferences, data 
material from questionnaires should consequently be added by further (objective) information (e.g. Sen 
1987b, Burchardt 2003). Nevertheless, subjective information is an important indicator of the degree of 
deprivation and should be accounted for.  
The capability space of meta-capabilities, which is an aggregation of the two sub-components, can now 
be represented as group or individual capability set. With reference to Klasen (2005) again, it should 
therefore be weighted and made comparable. Values of capabilities can be elicited on a scale between 1 
(heavily deprived) and 5 (not deprived). The determination of the weights of each component is a 
question for debate and further research. If we succeed, however, in doing so, the development of 
comprehensive capability-indicators based on a broad informational base becomes possible. In the 
following table I point out one way of operationalising some sub-capabilities. The micro level reflects 
subjective self-evaluation, whereas the macro level should add an objective component. On the right, 
some socio-political variable conversion factors are listed. The list is not to be regarded as complete: 
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Table 4: Selected sub-capabilities operationalised 
Sub-capabilities Operationalisation (micro 
level) 
Operationalisation 
(macro level) 
Variable social 
(political) 
conversion factors 
Freedom of 
movement 
Feeling of safety walking 
alone in the area near one’s 
home during daytime; 
Feeling of safety walking 
alone in the area near one’s 
home after dark; 
Being exposed to violence 
at  home 
Regional crime rate 
Security (city-ranking) 
Public security 
measures 
Political freedom Being afraid of political 
persecution; 
Being afraid of publicly 
expressing one’s opinion; 
Possibility of civil 
commitment 
Index of corruption  
Freedom of press index 
Constitutional laws; 
Public censorship 
Access to education Level of education; 
Formal precondition 
achieved; 
Level of parents’ education 
Conditions to university 
access (tuition 
fees/restricted access/etc.) 
National school 
system; 
Scholarship 
availability; 
Legal restrictions 
Personal 
development 
Personal intellectual 
capacity; 
Ability to pursue activities 
provoking one’s interest. 
Access to/availability of 
cultural institutions 
(museum, theatre, library, 
etc.) 
Entrance fees; 
Public cultural 
offerings; 
Public initiatives 
Access to health 
systems 
Personal health insurance;  
Service portfolio 
Public health insurance 
services 
Compulsory 
insurance system; 
Quality of health 
services 
State of health Chronic illness; 
Subjective state of health; 
Disadvantages in ordinary 
activities 
Regional pollution Retention; 
Handicapped 
accessible 
infrastructure 
Subjective well-
being 
Personal evaluation of well-
being; 
Personal evaluation of 
living standard 
(security/development) 
Economic development 
Political stability 
 
Continuity in 
economic 
development 
 
Economic 
participation 
Share of personal income 
increase in regional 
economic growth; 
Share of monthly income in 
fulfilling basic needs  
Inflation rate  
Regional availability of 
goods and services 
Regional economic 
growth 
Extra charges 
Source: own source 
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Although the capability approach rejects income as a central indicator, monetary issues still play an 
important instrumental role. Income can only give little information, however, about personal potential 
and deprivation. The crucial point against income is addressed against the implicit assumption that 
monetary amounts can sufficiently characterise the situation of the poor and that money can be 
homogeneously transformed into capabilities and functionings. As an individual conversion factor, 
however, money keeps its importance. The eight sub-capabilities (belonging to four meta-capabilities) 
operationalised as examples in Table 4, also reflect the scope between non-economic (freedom of 
arbitrariness), medium-economic (education and health) and economic (housing and material living 
standard) capabilities depending mainly on monetary resources as conversion factors. With reference to 
the basic capability level, the general capability level can also therefore be represented in a three-
dimensional space. The meta-capabilities get classified according to their main important conversion 
factors. The list of variable conversion factors included in the table, is not complete, but should 
emphasise the importance of public action and policy measures related to enhancing capability 
achievements.  
Trying to implement the CA on basis of available data such as the EU-SILC would mean 
compromising certain aspects. The concept of capability itself would be “impurified”. EU-SILC 
provides information about functionings only. Some capabilities, however, could be derived indirectly 
by combining and weighting distinct indicators. In a first step, we could elucidate the achieved well-
being in each capability-dimension. Following a former proposition of Sen, the achieved level can be 
interpreted as implicit set evaluation, which means that the value of the set is equated with the value of 
the best element in it (Sen 1985e, p.88). The achieved function might then be interpreted as best 
element of the available capability-set. Such proceedings can be justified only in pragmatic terms. 
Deprivation of functionings in central dimensions can’t generally be seen as result of a free choice in 
Europe and can therefore be put on a level with capability deprivation in these dimensions. In order to 
emphasise the freedom-aspect, however, SILC-indicators can be combined to new indicators and 
generate further information this way. The meta-capability ‘health’, to give an example, can be divided 
into ‘state of health’ on the micro level and ‘access to health services’ on the micro level. The 
following table shows, how both sub-capabilities might operationalised on basis of EU-SILC: 
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Table 5: Operationalising ‘Health’ on EU-SILC base 
Meta-Capability Micro indicator Operationalisation 
(EU-SILC) 
Macro indicator Operationalisation 
(EU-SILC) 
Health State of health  Being chronically ill 
AND disadvantages in 
ordinary activities 
Access to health 
services 
General sate of health 
(self-evaluation) AND 
non-take-up rate of 
necessary health 
services (last 12 
months) 
Source: own source on EU-SILC basis 
It can be argued, of course, that the macro indicator consists of a self-evaluation (general state of 
health) and of a functioning (non-take-up rate) and is therefore not a macro indicator at all. This is only 
partly true as the combination of both gives indirect information about the possibility in this space 
(access to health services), assuming that each set has the value of its best element, as was said before. 
Now both indicators have to be weighted and transformed in the ‘1 (heavily deprived) to 5 (not 
deprived)’-scheme and aggregated to the meta-capability. Such a method, however, could be used to 
slightly change the perspective and to create new indicators with intrinsic capabilities in mind.  
4. Implications for a Capability-oriented Social Policy 
Capability applies to very different aspects with reference to individual as well as to collective levels. 
These aspects covers a scope from “on-the-job employability” to “lifelong learning”, the prevention of 
social and economic risks, balance between professional and private lives, and last, but not least, active 
and social security (Salais and Villeneuve 2004, p.14). Economic and social arrangements and welfare 
institutions shape the social opportunities in the member states. Unemployment, illness and disability, 
low income etc. have different impacts depending on the concept of the prevailing welfare state in the 
country in question. The economic- and socio-political status itself highly influences social risks. A 
capability-based evaluation of national social security systems therefore is the first challenge on the 
way to a social policy concept for an EU capability-policy. The first question to be asked is, where to 
begin the prevention of capability deprivation. Many welfare institutions today focus on financial 
benefits in certain situations. Monetary transfers count among the most important measures to reduce 
(income-based) poverty. Poverty reduction through monetary transfer, however, varies between 13% in 
Greece to 62% in Denmark and Sweden (Adelantado and Calderón Cuevas 2006, EUROSTAT 2005). 
A capability-based social policy has to prevent capability-deprivation through socio-political 
arrangements. Although there is no question that transfers affect poverty negatively, preventive action 
should be explicitly focused. Barriers of effective participation must be as far as possible reduced. In 
contrast to neo-liberal approaches: 
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“Capability theory […] insists on paying regard to the institutional preconditions for the effective 
participation of individuals in market activities. Contrary to neoliberalism, these are not limited to the 
provision by private law, of contractual capacity or the right to hold property, but extend to collective 
mechanism for the sharing and distribution of social risks arising from the operation of markets. […] 
The EU, which already recognises that social rights have a place within an integrated market order, is 
ideally placed to play a central role in this process.” (Deakin 2005, p.20) 
The generation process of capabilities is highly dependant on conversion factors. Social and personal 
conversion factors, however, have to be kept apart. Capability-based social policies must focus on such 
factors that can be varied by the political measures put forward. Whereas the field of commodities 
refers to traditional provision policies by the state, it is now important to examine how income 
allocation can contribute to improving the possibilities of participation. As Raveaud and Salais (2001) 
note, traditional forms of welfare policy sometimes initially cause social exclusion. The majority of 
single mothers work part-time with a salary below the monetary poverty line and consequently become 
dependent on publicly provided special payments or minimum incomes. As the social expenditure for 
this group rise heavily, arguments against welfare recipients and the development of a non-working 
underclass are supported (Martin 1996). Society and the state finally determine if limited personal 
conversion factors and low income result in a deprivation of important capabilities or not. Thus, the 
line of action for social policy can be drawn as follows:  
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Figure 2: Fields of a capability-based social policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own source 
A capability-oriented social policy aims at enhancing individual and collective possibilities. Those 
personal and social conversion factors, which can be varied by the institutional arrangement, are to be 
filtered such that the conversion process will generate enlarged capability-sets. This sounds abstract; 
however, there are precise implications, such as handicapped accessible facilities: That way, despite 
their disadvantages handicapped people can easily participate in the social sphere. The social exclusion 
of disabled persons is often based on their inability the impossibility to participate in normal social life 
as well as in the market processes. The invariant factor “physical damage” can be reduced in its 
significance for capability-generation by varying some essential social conversion factors. Improving 
infrastructure is the first thing to do in many cases: “Reduced mobility by the social system as such” is 
an example of an invariable social conversion factor. In order to convert such factors into variable 
dimensions, a exhaustive social restructuring process is required. In the long run, welfare programs 
must be improved and rearranged with this purpose. In the short run, however, the aim is to remove 
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fair system must furnish the means to achieve effective freedom to act“ (2001, p.54).  
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A serious implementation of the CA, however, is a mission. Social science must provide approaches, 
which are theoretically well-grounded and empirically applicable. After that, of course, not just 
politics, but all connected institutions and organisations should be involved in this process. Sen has 
emphasised the importance of NGOs and other welfare institutions in promoting a “capability-turn” in 
social policy. Furthermore, an application of the CA must be combined with a comprehensive 
evaluation of the possibilities and restrictions of social institutions. There are also economic grounds 
for the argument that the capability-perspective is advantageous: First, the targeted precision can be 
improved and second, means can be used more efficiently and effectively.  
Human beings and their personal history of development are at the centre of such a policy. 
Counterfactuals play in important role here: What could I have done? Such a question widens the scope 
of analysis and draws a more detailed picture of the possibilities society provides. Public policy should 
guarantee that technical change does not threaten the capabilities of those who are worst off, but that 
everyone benefits from such developments. Access to the internet – as put forward as an example by 
Raveaud and Salais (2001, p.61) – is neither assured by money transfer nor by the provision of a 
computer, but by aided training and instruction courses only. This is a clear illustration of varying 
personal conversion factors, by which capability-sets can be enlarged. Capability-oriented social policy 
implications for several social and welfare systems in Europe will be an important issue in the future 
and might be an incentive for future research.  
An examination of the subsidiarity principle and its restrictions might be of interest against this 
backdrop. EU member states obviously will continue to remain at the wheel in certain policy fields. 
Co-operation and co-ordination of social protection policies between member states therefore become 
more and more important. Fouarge  states that “this need emanates from the lack of instruments 
available for the member states to correct for economic shocks as the EMU consolidates and from the 
probable increase in low-skilled labour mobility in the wake of the EU enlargement” (2004, p.201). 
The capability-perspective thus becomes the challenge for the new century.  
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